Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Francisco J. André & Luis M. de Castro, 2015. "Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," Working Papers 2015.06, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Antoniou, Fabio & Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia, 2015. "On The Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution: The Case of Multiple Pollutants," Working Papers in Economics 610, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis Miguel, 2015. "Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," MPRA Paper 61770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Guy Meunier, 2015. "Prices vs. quantities in presence of a second, unpriced, externality," Working Papers hal-01242040, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsEmission permit market; Demand uncertainty; Imperfect competition; Market integration; D82; D43; L13;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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