Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures
Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production, and proposes an efficient criterion for the allocation of tradable rights among firms with market power and competitive fringe firms. The suggested criterion maximizes efficiency of the market based regulation. A simple numerical example illustrates the theoretical discussion. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hanley Hanley, 1992.
"Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical analysis,"
842, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Hanley, Nick D & Moffatt, Ian, 1993. "Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical Analysis," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 40(1), pages 69-87, February.
- Nick Hanley & Ian Moffatt, 1992. "Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers Series 92/2, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Kerr, Suzi & Sanchirico, James & Newell, Richard, 2002.
"Fishing Quota Markets,"
dp-02-20, Resources For the Future.
- Fershtman,C. & de Zeeuw,A., 1995.
"Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly,"
45-95, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:28:y:2005:i:2:p:205-223. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.