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The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction

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Listed:
  • Porter, David
  • Rassenti, Stephen
  • Shobe, William
  • Smith, Vernon
  • Winn, Abel

Abstract

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential English clock (SEC) auction, and a combinatorial English clock (CEC) auction. We find the SEC and CEC mechanisms to be superior the CSB when demand is relatively elastic.

Suggested Citation

  • Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:2:p:190-200
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