Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.
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- Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003.
"Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany,"
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- Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,31, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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- Lebrun, Bernard & Tremblay, Marie-Christine, 1999. "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multi-Unit Demands," Cahiers de recherche 9921, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
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- repec:feb:framed:0052 is not listed on IDEAS
- Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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