Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany
The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 10 (December)
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