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What Really Matters in Auction Design

  • Professor Paul Klemperer

    (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction-a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. Auction design is a matter of "horses for courses", not "one size fits all".

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mic/papers/0004/0004008.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0004008.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jul 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004008
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf; prepared on PC; to print on HP; pages: 20; figures: included
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  9. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, EconWPA.
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  11. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers 2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Klemperer, Paul, 1998. "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 757-769, May.
  13. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  14. Giulio Federico & David Rahman, 2001. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-W05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  15. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  16. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
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  19. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September.
  20. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  21. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 2005. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 508-518, March.
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  27. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 1999. "Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities," Working Papers 99-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  28. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
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  40. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1988. "Reputation in repeated second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-119, October.
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  45. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  46. Salant, David, 2000. "Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 195-204, May.
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