Information Acquisition in Auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1978. "Rational Expectations," Discussion Papers 406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- John G. Riley, 1986.
"Ex Post Information in Auctions,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
367, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Nicola Persico, 1996. "Information Acquisition in Affiliated Decision Problems," Discussion Papers 1149, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
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