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Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance

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  • Yao Luo

Abstract

We study the identification of first-price auctions with nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we extend Hu, McAdams, and Shum (2013) by relaxing the first-order stochastic dominance condition. Instead, we assume restricted stochastic dominance relations among the value quantile functions and show that the same relations pass to the bid quantile functions. An ordered tree summarizes these relations and provides a total ordering. Relying on the proposed restricted stochastic dominance ordering, we extend a list of identification results in the empirical auction literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Yao Luo, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance," Working Papers tecipa-606, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2013. "Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-056, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    3. Fox, Jeremy T. & Kim, Kyoo il & Ryan, Stephen P. & Bajari, Patrick, 2012. "The random coefficients logit model is identified," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(2), pages 204-212.
    4. Li, Tong & Perrigne, Isabelle & Vuong, Quang, 2000. "Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 129-161, September.
    5. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 10105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
    7. Keisuke Hirano & Jack R. Porter, 2003. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Parametric Structural Models with Parameter-Dependent Support," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(5), pages 1307-1338, September.
    8. Hu, Yingyao, 2008. "Identification and estimation of nonlinear models with misclassification error using instrumental variables: A general solution," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 27-61, May.
    9. Kim, Dong-Hyuk, 2015. "Nonparametric estimation of utility function in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 101-106.
    10. Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2016. "Quantile methods for first-price auction: A signal approach," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_23, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    11. Véronique Flambard & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1014-1036, October.
    12. Victor Chernozhukov & Han Hong, 2004. "Likelihood Estimation and Inference in a Class of Nonregular Econometric Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1445-1480, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Restricted Stochastic Dominance; Unobserved Heterogeneity; Identification; Misclassification; Auction; Risk Aversion;

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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