IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v8y1994i4p65-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

Author

Listed:
  • William P. Rogerson

Abstract

This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

Suggested Citation

  • William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:4:p:65-90
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.4.65
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.8.4.65
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George Daly & James Schuttinga, 1982. "Price competition and the acquisition of weapons systems," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(1), pages 55-65.
    2. Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 206-213, Spring.
    3. Steve Kelman, 1990. "Procurement and Public Management," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53122, September.
    4. Lichtenberg, Frank R, 1988. "The Private R&D Investment Response to Federal Design and Technical Competitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 550-559, June.
    5. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    6. Anthony G. Bower & Kent Osband, 1991. "When More is Less: Defense Profit Policy in a Competitive Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    7. Kovacic, William E, 1991. "Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 219-240, September.
    8. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1990. "Measuring the effectiveness of competition in defense procurement: A survey of the empirical literature," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(1), pages 60-79.
    9. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Discussion Papers 1078, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Market Structure [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    3. William E. Kovacic & Dennis E. Smallwood, 1994. "Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 91-110, Fall.
    4. Kosnik, Lea & Lange, Ian, 2011. "Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 155-165, September.
    5. Artz, Kendall W. & Brush, Thomas H., 2000. "Asset specificity, uncertainty and relational norms: an examination of coordination costs in collaborative strategic alliances," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 337-362, April.
    6. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers 1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Garg, Shresth & Ghosh, Pulak & Tan, Brandon Joel, 2023. "Within firm supply chains: Evidence from India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    8. Simon Wiederhold, 2012. "The Role of Public Procurement in Innovation: Theory and Empirical Evidence," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 43.
    9. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2020. "Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 1011-1031, April.
    11. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Auctions, Ex Post Competition And Prices: The Efficiency Of Public‐Private Partnerships," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 521-554, December.
    12. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers 2002-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    13. Carril, Rodrigo & Duggan, Mark, 2020. "The impact of industry consolidation on government procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense contracting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    14. Evgeny Popov & Victoria Simonova, 2015. "The impact of culture on inter-firm relations in corporations," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 11(1), pages 39-52.
    15. Yossef Spiegel, 1996. "The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 379-407, September.
    16. Kosnik, Lea-Rachel, 2014. "Determinants of contract completeness: An environmental regulatory application," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 198-208.
    17. Michael Ian Cragg, 1995. "Performance Incentives in Government Subcontracting: Evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)," Labor and Demography 9507001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    19. Thomas P. Lyon, 2000. "Competition and Technological Complexity in Procurement: An Empirical Study of Dual Sourcing," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0420, Econometric Society.
    20. Berulava George & Lezhava David, 2007. "The impact of trust on the mode of transaction governance between manufacturer and distributor," EERC Working Paper Series 07-05e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:4:p:65-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.