IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

  • William P. Rogerson
Registered author(s):

    This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.8.4.65
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

    Volume (Year): 8 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
    Pages: 65-90

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:4:p:65-90
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.4.65
    Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. George Daly & James Schuttinga, 1982. "Price competition and the acquisition of weapons systems," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(1), pages 55-65.
    2. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
    3. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1990. "Measuring the effectiveness of competition in defense procurement: A survey of the empirical literature," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(1), pages 60-79.
    4. Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 206-213, Spring.
    5. Steve Kelman, 1990. "Procurement and Public Management," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53122, 6.
    6. Anthony G. Bower & Kent Osband, 1991. "When More is Less: Defense Profit Policy in a Competitive Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    7. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:4:p:65-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)

    or (Michael P. Albert)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.