IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/1078.html

Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

Author

Listed:
  • William P. Rogerson

Abstract

This paper descrives some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurment policy analysis. It descrives the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

Suggested Citation

  • William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Discussion Papers 1078, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1078
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1078.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1989. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1284-1305, December.
    2. Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 206-213, Spring.
    3. Steve Kelman, 1990. "Procurement and Public Management," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53122, September.
    4. Frank R. Lichtenberg, 1988. "Government Subsidies to Private Military R&D Investment: DOD's IR&D Policy," NBER Working Papers 2745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    6. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    7. Rogerson, William P, 1990. "Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 83-92, March.
    8. Michael H. Riordan & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Second Sourcing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 41-58, Spring.
    9. Anthony G. Bower & Kent Osband, 1991. "When More is Less: Defense Profit Policy in a Competitive Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    10. Kovacic, William E, 1991. "Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 219-240, September.
    11. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Oden, 2000. "Federal Defense Industrial Policy, Firm Strategy, and Regional Conversion Initiatives in Four American Aerospace Regions," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 23(1), pages 25-47, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
    2. Garg, Shresth & Ghosh, Pulak & Tan, Brandon Joel, 2023. "Within firm supply chains: Evidence from India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    3. Yossef Spiegel, 1996. "The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 379-407, September.
    4. Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Market Structure [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    5. Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.
    6. Kosnik, Lea & Lange, Ian, 2011. "Contract renegotiation and rent re-distribution: Who gets raked over the coals?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 155-165, September.
    7. William P. Rogerson, 1988. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation : Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 759, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Artz, Kendall W. & Brush, Thomas H., 2000. "Asset specificity, uncertainty and relational norms: an examination of coordination costs in collaborative strategic alliances," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 337-362, April.
    9. Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker & Rodrigo Carril, 2022. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers 1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Yongmin Chen & Ron Smith, 2001. "Equilibrium Cost Overruns," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 2(2), pages 401-414, November.
    11. Dalen, D.M. & von der Fehr, N.-H.M. & Moen, E.R., 1998. "Regulation and Wage Bargaining," Memorandum 13/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    12. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 516-537, Winter.
    13. Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2020. "Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 1011-1031, April.
    14. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers 2002-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    15. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. repec:bla:jomstd:v:47:y:2010:i:s1:p:859-883 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Matthew J. Bidwell, 2012. "Politics and Firm Boundaries: How Organizational Structure, Group Interests, and Resources Affect Outsourcing," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 1622-1642, December.
    18. Evgeny Popov & Victoria Simonova, 2015. "The impact of culture on inter-firm relations in corporations," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 11(1), pages 39-52.
    19. Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Economic Organization of Trading Relationships: Hierarchies and Asset Ownership," Discussion Papers 824, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. Nicola Doni, 2006. "The Importance Of Reputation In Awarding Public Contracts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 401-429, December.
    21. Dieter Bös, 1999. "Inefficient R&D in Public Procurement: Negative Consequences of a Separation between Award and Actual Contract," CESifo Working Paper Series 208, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1078. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fran Walker The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Fran Walker to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.