Equilibrium Cost Overruns
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lichtenberg, Frank R., 1989. "How elastic is the government's demand for weapons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 57-78.
- Lichtenberg, Frank R., 1989.
"How elastic is the government's demand for weapons?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, pages 57-78.
- Lichtenberg, F.R., 1988. "How Elastic Is The Government'S Demand For Weapons?," Papers fb-_88-39, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
- Frank R. Lichtenberg, 1989. "How Elastic is the Government's Demand for Weapons?," NBER Working Papers 3025, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
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- Rogerson, William P, 1990. "Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 83-92.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2016. "Sequential screening and the relationship between principal's preferences and agent's incentives," SERIES 01-2016, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2016.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "Sequential screening with privately known characteristics of cost distribution," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201502, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
More about this item
KeywordsCost overrun; Procurement; Cost sharing; Bidding;
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
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