On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitment by Monopolists
The establishment of an asking, or ceiling, price from which reductions can be bargained is a common selling practice. For a monopolist seller of a single object, this article characterizes the best such ceiling price and shows that its use is optimal among all incentive-compatible mechanisms in a class of situations characterized by customers (1) who arrive one at a time and so do not compete with other directly and (2) who learn their idiosyncratic willingnesses to pay only by incurring idiosyncratic inspection costs.
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|Date of creation:||1994|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.|
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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