Economics of defense R&D
In: Handbook of Defense Economics
This chapter examines a number of aspects of defense R&D, including: mechanisms -- design competitions, and independent R&D subsidies -- used by the US government to encourage firms to invest their own funds in defense R&D; theory and evidence concerning both the private and social benefits of, or returns to, R&D conducted by defense contractors; the effect of defense R&D on nondefense R&D investment; the response of government decision-makers to cost information yielded by defense R&D; and the dynamic optimality of R&D projects.
|This chapter was published in: ||This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Defense Economics with number
1-15.||Handle:|| RePEc:eee:hdechp:1-15||Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hdechp:1-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.