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Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers

  • Thomas G. McGuire

    ()

  • Michael H. Riordan

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

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Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0010.

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Date of creation: Jun 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0010
Contact details of provider: Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-4449
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
Email:


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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Working papers 403, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer.
  4. David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, 1979. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Discussion Papers 412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-33, Fall.
  6. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-87, June.
  7. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Cartelization by Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 111-30, June.
  9. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
  10. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington & Pablo T. Spiller, 1987. "Managing Supplier Switching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 77-97, Spring.
  11. Michael H. Riordan & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Second Sourcing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 41-58, Spring.
  12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1989. "Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 538-552, Winter.
  13. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  14. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  15. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
  16. Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1988. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," Working Papers 675, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
  18. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707, May.
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