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L?influenza dell?enforcement contrattuale sulla qualit? della prestazione negli appalti pubblici: una rassegna teorica

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  • Guido Tatone

Abstract

In questo articolo analizziamo l?influenza dell?ipotesi di prestazione non perfettamente verificabile sulla corretta esecuzione della promessa contrattuale. Proponiamo una rassegna sulla letteratura economica che ha affrontato questa problematica. Presentiamo dapprima i risultati di alcuni modelli che trattano tale tema in un contesto di mercati competitivi. Illustreremo poi i lavori che utilizzano il concetto di reputation for past behavior per punire comportamenti opportunistici in un contesto di appalti pubblici. Discuteremo inoltre dei risultati di Kim (1998) derivanti dall?adozione di una regola di esclusione delle imprese con cattiva reputazione e quelli di Doni (2005) derivanti dall?uso di una politica di premio per la buona reputazione della P.A. (Doni, 2005). Infine accenneremo ai vantaggi dell?adozione di un?asta pesata per la reputazione -------- (2007) o di un meccanismo di competitive discretionary tendering (Albano, Cesi e Iozzi, 2011)

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Tatone, 2016. "L?influenza dell?enforcement contrattuale sulla qualit? della prestazione negli appalti pubblici: una rassegna teorica," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(2), pages 107-129.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:epepep:v:html10.3280/ep2016-002004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
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    1. Guido Tatone, 2018. "La reputazione negli appalti pubblici: uno strumento socialmente desiderabile per risolvere il problema dello scadimento qualitativo," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1), pages 59-85.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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