IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Strategic Procurement, Openness and Market Structure

  • Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso

    ()

  • Paul Levine

We examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its effect on market structure in sectors, such as defence, where the government is the dominant consumer. In a world economy with trade between producers, and between producers and non-producers, we use a modified Dixit-Stiglitz utility function with an independent taste for variety. Governments can, in effect, choose the number of domestic firms and their size by adjusting the procurement price. Unlike the standard model with no independent taste for variety and no external sector of non-producers, there are incentives for subsidies, openness impacts on industrial structure and there are potential gains from procurement coordination between producer countries.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0503.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0503.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0503
Contact details of provider: Postal:
School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP

Phone: +44 (0)1227 827497
Web page: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Beath,John & Katsoulacos,Yannis, 1991. "The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521335263, Junio.
  2. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
  3. Yang, Xiaokai & Heijdra, Ben J, 1993. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 295-301, March.
  4. Maria Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine, 2004. "Strategic Procurement, Openness and Market Structure," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0904, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  5. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier.
  6. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul, 2007. "Arms Trade and Arms Races: A Strategic Analysis," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  7. del Carmen Garcia-Alonso, Maria, 2000. "The role of technology security in a model of trade with horizontal differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 747-772, July.
  8. Javier Coto-Martínez & María D. C. García-Alonso & Paul Levine, 2009. "Taste For Variety And Optimum Product Diversity In An Open Economy," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 127-138, 04.
  9. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
  10. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  11. Benassy, Jean-Pascal, 1996. "Taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 41-47, July.
  12. Marius BRÜLHART & Federico TRIONFETTI, 2000. "Public Expenditure and International Specialisation," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.23, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  13. Margaret K. Kyle, 2007. "Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(1), pages 88-99, February.
  14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, March.
  15. Achilladelis, Basil & Antonakis, Nicholas, 2001. "The dynamics of technological innovation: the case of the pharmaceutical industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 535-588, April.
  16. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707.
  17. Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2000. "The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 357-80, April.
  18. Malcolm Chalmers & Neil V. Davies & Keith Hartley & Chris Wilkinson, 2002. "The economic costs and benefits of UK defence exports," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 23(3), pages 305-342, September.
  19. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
  20. Paul Dunne & Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2007. "Determining The Defence Industrial Base," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 199-221.
  21. Miyagiwa, Kaz, 1991. "Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1320-28, December.
  22. Paul Levine & Fotis Mouzakis & Ron Smith, 2000. "Arms export controls and emerging domestic producers," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 505-531.
  23. Krugman, Paul R., 1979. "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-479, November.
  24. Brulhart, Marius & Trionfetti, Federico, 2004. "Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 851-881, August.
  25. Mary Carmen Garcia-Alonso, 1999. "Price competition in a model of arms trade," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 273-303.
  26. Venables, Anthony J, 1987. "Trade and Trade Policy with Differentiated Products: A Chamberlinian-Ricardian Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 700-717, September.
  27. J Paul Dunne & Maria Garcia Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2003. "Concentration in the International Arms Industry¤," Working Papers 0301, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tracey Girling)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.