Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
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- Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2016. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5838, CESifo Group Munich.
References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:spr:epolin:v:45:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40812-017-0088-3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 56, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
More about this item
KeywordsAuction; Cost Overrun; Procurement; Renegotiation;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2016-04-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2016-04-16 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2016-04-16 (Regulation)
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