Properties of Scoring Auctions
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More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
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