Architecture of Power Markets
Liberalization of infrastructure industries presents classic economic issues about how organization and procedure affect market performance. These issues are examined in wholesale power markets. The perspective from game theory complements standard economic theory to examine effects on efficiency and incentives. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.
Volume (Year): 70 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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