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On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest

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  • Prokopovych, Pavlo
  • Yannelis, Nicholas C.

Abstract

We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. The contestants have continua of possible types and bids, atomless type distributions, and their valuations and costs might depend not only on their own bids and types but also on other bidders' bids and types. Many, quite different contests are covered by our generalized contest model and equilibrium existence in monotone pure strategies in them follows from this paper's results.

Suggested Citation

  • Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:348-362
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest; All-pay auction; Payoff security; Monotone equilibrium; Local intersection property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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