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Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

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  • Wasser, Cédric

Abstract

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 331, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:331
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2015. "Probabilistic procurement auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 25-46, March.
    2. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    3. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard P. McLean, 2018. "On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(2), pages 100-129, February.
    4. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types," ECON - Working Papers 159, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2025. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 387-413, September.
    6. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    7. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2020. "Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 750-787, September.
    8. Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Equilibrium existence in group contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 265-276, October.
    9. Foster, Joshua & Haley, M. Ryan, 2022. "Charity auctions as assets: Theory and simulations of fundraising risk management in mean-variance space," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    10. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
    11. Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Innovation contests with entry auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 165-176.
    12. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    13. Ewerhart, Christian, 2014. "Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 115-118.
    14. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
    15. Barbieri, Stefano & Kovenock, Dan & Malueg, David A. & Topolyan, Iryna, 2019. "Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 382-411.
    16. Einy, E. & Haimanko, O. & Moreno, D. & Sela, A. & Shitovitz, B., 2015. "Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 241-245.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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