Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
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