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Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities

  • Sandro Brusco
  • Giuseppe Lopomo

Collusive equilibria exist in open ascending auctions with multiple objects, if the number of bidders is sufficiently small relative to the number of objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Hence the complementarities are not realized.

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File URL: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers99/99-05Lopomo.pdf
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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99-05.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:99-05
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New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126

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Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/

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  1. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
  2. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December.
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