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Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions

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  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    () (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

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  • Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 200207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:200207
    Note: Prepared for HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS, Ed. Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M., 1985. "Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 139-159, June.
    2. McCabe, Kevin A & Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L, 1990. "Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1276-1283, December.
    3. Clauser, Laura & Plott, Charles R., 1992. "On the Anatomy of the Nonfacilitating Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets," Working Papers 771, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    4. Davis, Douglas D & Williams, Arlington W, 1991. "The Hayek Hypothesis in Experimental Auctions: Institutional Effects and Market Power," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 261-274, April.
    5. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    6. Holt, Charles A & Langan, Loren W & Villamil, Anne P, 1986. "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 107-123, January.
    7. David Porter & Roumen Vragov, 2006. "An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 445-458.
    8. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Sefton, Martin & Wilner, Benjamin S., 2006. "Multi-unit auctions: A comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 304-323, October.
    9. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-252, May.
    10. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2002. "Collusion in private value ascending price auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 177-195, June.
    11. Cason, Timothy N., 2008. "Price Signaling and "Cheap Talk" in Laboratory Posted Offer Markets," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
    12. Kwasnica, Anthony M., 2000. "The choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 323-346, July.
    13. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March.
    14. Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999. "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, August.
    15. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
    17. R. Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 31-53, June.
    18. Dale J. Menkhaus & Owen R. Phillips & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Shared Agents and Competition in Laboratory English Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(4), pages 829-839.
    19. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2005. "Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 170-207, November.
    20. Alsemgeest, Paul & Noussair, Charles & Olson, Mark, 1998. "Experimental Comparisons of Auctions under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 87-97, January.
    21. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-454, March.
    22. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
    23. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    24. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1984. " Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 983-1010, September.
    25. Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June.
    26. Banks, Jeffrey & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 2003. "Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 303-350, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ping Zhang, 2009. "Uniform price auctions and fixed price offerings in IPOs: an experimental comparison," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 202-219, June.
    2. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Ping Zhang, 2009. "Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Uniform Price IPO Auctions," Discussion Papers 2009-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    5. Sascha F├╝llbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "An experimental investigation of collusion in hard-close auctions: partners and friends," FEMM Working Papers 07024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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