Collusion without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions
The study addresses the issue of sustainability of collusion in one-sided auctions. Earlier experimental studies indicate that, in double oral auctions, collusion is hard to sustain even if conspiracy is allowed and quotation improvement rules are absent. We investigate the role of similar institutional features in one-sided auctions.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia|
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- Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1984.
"The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 479-507, October.
- Grether, David M. & Plott, Charles R., "undated". "The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case," Working Papers 404, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1990. "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 493-510, June.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Ramey, Valerie & Williams, Arlington W., 1984. "The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 191-222, June.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M., 1985. "Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 139-159, June.
- Clauser, Laura & Plott, Charles R., 1992. "On the Anatomy of the Nonfacilitating Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets," Working Papers 771, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)