Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects
We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.
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Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 1999.
"Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities,"
99-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Collusion via signaling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6518, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
- Albano, Gian Luigi & Germano, Fabrizio & Lovo, Stefano, 2001.
"A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 55-60, April.
- ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio & LOVO, Stefano, . "A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1556, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio & LOVO, Stefano, 1999. "A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies," CORE Discussion Papers 1999052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Stefano Lovo & Fabrizio Germano & Gian Luigi Albano, 2001. "A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies," Post-Print hal-00460031, HAL.
- Stefano Lovo & Gian Luigi Albano & Fabrizio Germano, 1999. "A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies," Working Papers hal-00599418, HAL.
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000.
"Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1210, Econometric Society.
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