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Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts

Author

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  • Lunander, Anders

    (Swedish Business School)

  • Lundberg, Sofia

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand-alone bids in order to favour their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand-alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer’s cost as explained by auction format is found.

Suggested Citation

  • Lunander, Anders & Lundberg, Sofia, 2011. "Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts," Umeå Economic Studies 825, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0825
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    Cited by:

    1. Hultkrantz, Lars & Lunander, Anders, 2013. "Design of a Combinatorial Bidding Market for Green Corridor Freight," Working Papers 2013:6, Örebro University, School of Business.

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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