Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications
We use a classroom game, the Wallet Game, to show that slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices in standard ascending (i.e. English) auctions of common-values objects. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or a small ownership of the object by one bidder. The effects of these asymmetries are greatly exacerbated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to Airwaves Auctions and Takeover Battles including the Glaxo-Wellcome Merger.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:757-769. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.