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Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence

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  • Hansen, Robert G

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  • Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 125-142, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:24:y:1986:i:1:p:125-42
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
    3. Stephen Buschbom & Carolyn Dehring & Neil Dunse & Henry Munneke, 2018. "Sealed-Bid Auctions and Fixed Price Sales: Seller Choice in Housing Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 525-545, May.
    4. Jingfeng Lu & Isabelle Perrigne, 2008. "Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 871-896.
    5. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
    6. Boltz, Frederick & Douglas, R. Carter & Michael, G. Jacobson, 2002. "Shadow pricing diversity in U. S. national forests," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 185-197.
    7. Cheng, Harrison, 2006. "Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4-5), pages 471-498, August.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
    9. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
    10. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    11. Niquidet, Kurt & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2004. "Are Log Markets Competitive? Empirical Evidence And Implications For Canada-U.S. Trade In Softwood Lumber," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 19985, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Li, Tong, 2010. "Indirect inference in structural econometric models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(1), pages 120-128, July.
    13. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    14. Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Fixed Revenue Auctions: Theory And Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 342-354, July.
    15. Yamamoto, Yuki & Takeuchi, Kenji & Shinkuma, Takayoshi, 2014. "Is there a price premium for certified wood? Empirical evidence from log auction data in Japan," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 168-172.
    16. Yuen Leng Chow & Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2014. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 253-278, June.
    17. Porter, Robert H, 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January.
    18. Michael Dooley & Peter Isard & Mark Taylor, 1992. "Exchange Rates, Country Preferences, and Gold," NBER Working Papers 4183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000524, UCLA Department of Economics.
    20. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    21. Frenkel, Sivan & Heller, Yuval & Teper, Roee, 2012. "Endowment as a blessing," MPRA Paper 39430, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Apr 2012.
    22. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10076, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Han, Xiao & Kant, Shashi & Xie, Yi, 2018. "A spatial hedonic stumpage analysis of standing timber auctions in Jiangxi Province of China," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 63-74.
    24. Schlingemann, Frederik & Wu, Hong, 2015. "Determinants and shareholder wealth effects of the sales method in acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 469-485.

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