IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales

  • Gerard Marty

    ()

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

  • Raphaele Preget

    ()

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière, INRA - AgroParisTech)

This socio-economic study aims to better understand the functioning and the evolution of timber sales held by the French public forest service. The auction mechanism is the historical institution which has been used in France for centuries. The recent will to develop supply contracts through private agreements is a major change in the French timber industry. It accurately raises questions about the timber prices issue.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www6.nancy.inra.fr/lef/content/download/2911/28870/version/1/file/doc_LEF_n2007-03.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Benoit Vandenbroucke)


File Function: First version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA in its series Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF with number 2007-03.

as
in new window

Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2007-03
Contact details of provider: Postal: 14 rue Girardet, 54042 Nancy cedex
Phone: 33 (0)3 83 39 68 66
Fax: 33 (0)3 83 37 06 45
Web page: http://www.nancy.inra.fr/lef
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Lusht, Kenneth M, 1994. "Order and Price in a Sequential Auction," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 259-66, May.
  2. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 10105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Working Papers 2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Menezes, F. & Monteiro, P.K., 1999. "Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions," Papers 366, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  5. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
  6. Paarsch, H.J., 1992. "Empirical Models of Auctions and an Application to British Columbian Timber Sales," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9212, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  7. Eric S. Maskin & John G. Riley, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," UCLA Economics Working Papers 359, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Brannman, Lance Eric, 1996. "Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 730-45, October.
  9. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  10. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
  11. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1992. "Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 977, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1, March.
  13. von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik Morch, 1994. "Predatory Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 345-56, July.
  14. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February.
  15. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
  16. Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995. "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers 7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  17. Ashenfelter, O. & Genesove, D., 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in real Estate Auctions," Papers 128, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
  18. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 227-44, September.
  19. repec:att:wimass:9215 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
  21. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Discussion Papers 1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
  23. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
  24. Jane Black & David de Meza, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences Between Successive Auctionsare no Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(4), pages 607-628, December.
  25. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," Working Papers 829, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  26. Raphaële Préget & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2006. "Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 593-603.
  27. Paarsch, Harry J., 1997. "Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 333-357, June.
  28. Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 125-42, January.
  29. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-55, Summer.
  30. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994. "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November.
  31. Vanderporten, Bruce, 1992. "Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-67, September.
  32. Etzioni, Amitai, 1986. "The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 159-184, October.
  33. Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
  34. Gale Ian L. & Hausch Donald B., 1994. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 318-331, November.
  35. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Empirical Testing of Auction Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 156-59, May.
  36. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
  37. Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999. "Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
  38. Donald B. Hausch, 1986. "Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1599-1610, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lef:wpaper:2007-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Vandenbroucke)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Benoit Vandenbroucke to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.