Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions
When many similar properties are being auctioned, auctioneers often resort to the pooled design. The winning bidder of a given round is given a choice among all the unclaimed (pooled) properties. Bidding strategy depends on expectations of rival bidders' behavior as well as personal valuation. Anecdotal evidence from condominium auctions suggests that bidding decisions can produce price anomalies. This study develops a simple theoretical model with three active bidders and three units for sale to show how such anomalies may emerge. Estimation is then made of a hedonic price model using data from a condominium auction of 53 units on three separate dates. The empirical results support the view that the best buys are found in the middle of the auction with over-payments at the beginning and end. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 5 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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