Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies
Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio frequency spec trum, we consider situations where multiple objects are auctioned simultaneousl y by means of a second-price, sealed-bid auction. For some buyers, called globa l bidders, the value of multiple objects exceeds the sum of the objects' values separately. Others, called local bidders, are interested in only one object. I n a simple independent private values setting, we (a) characterize an equilibri um that is symmetric among the global bidders; (b) show that the addition of bi dders often leads to less aggressive bidding; and (c) compare the revenues obta ined from the simultaneous auction to those from its sequential counterpart.
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|Date of creation:||Mar 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.|
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
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- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
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