Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction
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References listed on IDEAS
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- A Banerji & J.V. Meenakshi, 2010. "Competition and Collusion in Grain Markets: Basmati Auctions in North India," Working Papers id:2701, eSocialSciences.
- Coatney, Kalyn T. & Shaffer, Sherrill L. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2012. "Auction prices, market share, and a common agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 61-73.
- Meenakshi, J.V. & Banerji, A., 2005. "The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 377-403, April.
- J.V. Meenakshi & A. Banerji, 2001. "The Unsupportable Support Price: The Government in Paddy Auctions of Northern India," Working papers 94, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June.
- Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus, 2009. "Maintaining Tacit Collusion in Repeated Ascending Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 91-109, February.
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