Competition and Collusion in Grain Markets: Basmati Auctions in North India
Many small wholesale grain markets in India are characterized by large numbers of sellers and a relatively small number of buyers, thereby lending the price formation process open to manipulation through collusion. Government intervention limits the extent of such manipulation through the institution of regulated markets, where the rules of exchange are clearly spelled out and the price formation process is transparent. Unfortunately, recent studies that document how agricultural markets operateâ€”especially in Northern Indiaâ€”and the extent to which they hinder or serve farmers, are rare. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by studying the functioning of a regulated basmati paddy market in the state of Haryana in North India. [Working Paper No. 91]
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Laffont, J.J., 1996.
"Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,"
95.394, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995.
"Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales,"
7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Sareen, Samita, 1999. "Posterior Odds Comparison of a Symmetric Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction within the Common-Value and the Independent-Private-Values Paradigms," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 651-676, Nov.-Dec..
- Jha, Raghbendra & Murthy, K. V. B. & Nagarajan, Hari K. & Seth, Ashok, 1999.
"Components of the wholesale bid-ask spread and the structure of grain markets: the case of rice in India,"
Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 173-189, October.
- Jha, Raghbendra & Murthy, K.V.B. & Nagarajan, Hari K. & Seth, Ashok, 1999. "Components of the wholesale bid-ask spread and the structure of grain markets: the case of rice in India," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 21(2), October.
- Jha, R. & Murthy, K.V.B. & Nagarajan, H.K. & Seth, A.K., 1998. "Components of the Wholesale Bid-Ask Spread and the Structure of Grain Markets: The Case of Rice in India," Papers 143, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research-.
- Matthew Shum, 1998. "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers mshum-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
- Skrzypacz, A. & Hopenhayn, H., 1999. "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions," RCER Working Papers 463, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
- Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
- Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.