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The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India

  • Meenakshi, J.V.
  • Banerji, A.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 76 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 377-403

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:76:y:2005:i:2:p:377-403
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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  1. A. Banerji and J.V.Meenakshi & J.V.Meenakshi, 2002. "Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis," Working papers 104, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July.
  3. Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995. "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers 7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  4. Sukhatme, Vasant A & Abler, David G, 1997. "Economists and Food Price Policy Distortions: The Case of India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 79-96, October.
  5. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1997. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," NBER Working Papers 6037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Haile, P.A., 1997. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," Working papers 9702, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-33, March.
  8. Athey,S. & Haile,P.A., 2000. "Identification of standard auction models," Working papers 13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2001. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions," Research Papers 1698r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
  11. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
  12. Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 517-567, August.
  13. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
  14. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 453, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  15. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
  16. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
  17. Schiff, Maurice, 1993. "India's food procurement and distribution policy Impact on prices and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 387-397, December.
  18. A. Banerji & J. V. Meenakshi, 2004. "Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India," Working papers 129, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  19. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
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