Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding
We examine the institutional details of the school milk procurement process, bidding data, statements of dairy executives, and supply characteristics in Ohio during the 1980's. We compare the bidding behavior of a group of firms to a control group. We find that the behavior of each of the firms differs from that of the control group. We argue that the behavior of these firms is consistent with collusion. The estimated average effect of collusion on market prices is about six and one half percent, or roughly the cost of shipping school milk about 50 miles.
|Date of creation:||May 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 263-288.|
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