Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data
This article illustrates the determinants of bidder collusion using data from German auctions. Special attention is thereby devoted to the question at whether art and antiques auctions are particularly attractive for bidding rings as the conditions for rings to succeed may be quite favorable at these auctions. Cartel stability at art auctions, for example, may be enforced by the structure of bidders or the expected surplus from collusive arrangements. Actually, the estimations of a binary choice model show that even after controlling for determinants suggested by auction theory, art and antiques auctions turn out to be particularly susceptible to bidder collusion. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Web page: http://www.culturaleconomics.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10824/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brannman, Lance Eric, 1996. "Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 730-45, October.
- Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2002.
"Auctions and the Price of Art,"
Economics Series Working Papers
131, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Elmar WOLFSTETTER, 1994.
"Auctions: An Introduction,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
1994,13, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997.
"Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 544-565, Autumn.
- Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 99184, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
- Luc BAUWENS & Victor GINSBURGH, 2000.
"Art experts and auctions Are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?,"
Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain)
2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Victor Ginsburgh & Luc Bauwens, 2000. "Art experts and auctions :are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/152099, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- BAUWENS, Luc & GINSBURGH, Victor, . "Art experts and auctions are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1485, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,"
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2011.
in: A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 2
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2002.
"Collusion in private value ascending price auctions,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 177-195, June.
- Sherstyuk, K., 1999. "Collusion in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 707, The University of Melbourne.
- Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999. "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- repec:oxf:wpaper:1999-w12 is not listed on IDEAS
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
- Cramton, Peter C, 1995.
"Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
- Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
- Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993. "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(3), pages 485-511, September.
- Srabana Gupta, 2002. "Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 13-25, March.
- Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995.
"Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales,"
7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:125-141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.