Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Meenakshi, J.V. & Banerji, A., 2005. "The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 377-403, April.
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More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; Cartels; Agricultural Markets.;
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-09-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CWA-2004-09-30 (Central & Western Asia)
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