Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management
Using semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques, we infer cost distributions and informational rents from 457 bids for snow removal contracts offered for tender by the City of Montreal between 1990 and 1998. Bids and costs have decreased over the sample period, while rents remained relatively constant. The City deserves credit for these results, as it has succeeded in exploiting economies of scale and triggering innovations while maintaining competition. Further, it has been successful in adjusting its reserve prices to keep up with the decreasing cost of snow removal.
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Volume (Year): 40 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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