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Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • A. Banerji and J.V.Meenakshi

    (Delhi School of Economics)

  • J.V.Meenakshi

    (Delhi School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper uses auction theory to analyze wholesale markets for wheat in Northern India. This approach enables us not only to characterize the market in terms of buyer asymmetries, but also to detect the existence of collusion and to quantify its impact on market prices. We show that buyer asymmetries exacerbate the downward impact of collusion on prices. The paper also demonstrates the use of auction theory to analyze questions of government efficiency. It considers whether the government paid too much for the wheat it procured at the minimum support price, and shows that for our sample it did not. The paper is based on a primary survey of two wholesale markets in North India.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Banerji and J.V.Meenakshi & J.V.Meenakshi, 2002. "Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis," Working papers 104, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:104
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Fafchamps & Ruth Vargas Hill & Bart Minten, 2008. "Quality control in nonstaple food markets: evidence from India," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 38(3), pages 251-266, May.
    2. Neha Gupta, 2015. "Government Intervention in Grain Markets in India: Rethinking the Procurement Policy," Working Papers id:7810, eSocialSciences.
    3. Imhof, David, 2017. "Econometric tests to detect bid-rigging cartels: does it work?," FSES Working Papers 483, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    4. Dawe, David C. & Moya, Piedad F. & Casiwan, Cheryll B. & Cabling, Jesusa M., 2008. "Rice marketing systems in the Philippines and Thailand: Do large numbers of competitive traders ensure good performance?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 455-463, October.
    5. Meenakshi, J.V. & Banerji, A., 2005. "The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 377-403, April.
    6. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2017. "Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information," Working Papers 1127, Economic Research Forum, revised 08 Oct 2017.
    7. Bart Minten & Anneleen Vandeplas & Johan Swinnen, 2011. "Regulations, Brokers, and Interlinkages: The Institutional Organization of Wholesale Markets in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 864-886, May.
    8. Imhof, David, 2017. "Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging," FSES Working Papers 484, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    9. Reardon, Thomas & Minten, Bart, 2011. "The quiet revolution in India's food supply chains:," IFPRI discussion papers 1115, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. Bernd-O. Heine & Matthias Meyer & Oliver Strangfeld, 2005. "Stylised Facts and the Contribution of Simulation to the Economic Analysis of Budgeting," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(4), pages 1-4.
    11. Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006. "Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. repec:eee:indorg:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:282-306 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Tania Begazo & Sara Nyman, 2016. "Competition and Poverty," World Bank Other Operational Studies 24251, The World Bank.
    14. M. Shahe Emran & Dilip Mookherjee & Forhad Shilpi & M. Helal Uddin, "undated". "Do Consumers Benefit from Supply Chain Intermediaries? Evidence from a Policy Experiment in Edible Oils Market in Bangladesh," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-273, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    15. Dipak Dasgupta & R N Dubey & R Satish, 2011. "Domestic Wheat Price Formation and Food Inflation in India: International Prices, Domestic Drivers (Stocks, Weather, Public Policy), and the Efficacy of Public Policy Interventions in Wheat Markets," Working Papers id:4291, eSocialSciences.
    16. Dasgupta, Dipak & Dubey, R.N. & Sathish, R, 2011. "Domestic Wheat Price Formation and Food Inflation in India," MPRA Paper 31564, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Minten, Bart & Reardon, Thomas & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2009. "Linking urban consumers and rural farmers in India: A comparison of traditional and modern food supply chains," IFPRI discussion papers 883, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    18. Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2018. "Machine Learning with Screens for Detecting Bid-Rigging Cartels," FSES Working Papers 494, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    19. Tatiana Komorova, 2009. "Nonparametric Identification inAsymmetricSecond-Price Auctions: A New Approach," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series 545, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    20. Ilya Morozov & Elena Podkolzina, 2013. "Collusion detection in procurement auctions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 25/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    21. Komarova, Tatiana, 2013. "A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50245, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wheat markets; Structural auctions; Buyer asymmetry; Collusion.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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