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Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions

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  • Riley, John G

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  • Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:3:y:1989:i:3:p:41-50
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    1. Bhalla, Surjit S & Glewwe, Paul, 1986. "Growth and Equity in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation of the Sri Lankan Experience," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 1(1), pages 35-63, September.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 243-250.
    3. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    4. Krueger, Anne O & Tuncer, Baran, 1982. "An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1142-1152.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Dutra, Joísa Campanher, 2001. "Hybrid Auctions I: Theory," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 421, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    2. Dutra, Joisa C. & Menezes, Flavio M., 2002. "Hybrid auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 301-307, November.
    3. Szentes, Balazs, 2005. "Equilibrium transformations and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 175-205, February.
    4. Munnell, Alicia H. & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell & Lynn E. Browne & James McEneaney, 1996. "Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 25-53.
    5. Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Manfred Königstein & Martin Strobel, 2002. "Bid Functions in Auctions and Fair Division Games: Experimental Evidence," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(4), pages 461-484, November.
    6. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
    7. Holst, Gesa Sophie & Hermann, Daniel & Musshoff, Oliver, 2015. "Anchoring effects in an experimental auction – Are farmers anchored?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 106-117.
    8. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "The Anglo-Dutch Auction," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1021, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    9. Madarász, Kristóf, 2015. "Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 10636, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1063-1080.
    11. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2009. "First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 256-269, January.
    12. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2005. "Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 39, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    13. Holst, Gese Sophie & Hermann, Daniel & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2014. "Anchoring Effects in an Experimental Auction," 54th Annual Conference, Goettingen, Germany, September 17-19, 2014 187386, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    14. Vleugels, Jan, 1997. "Bidding against an unknown number of competitors sharing affiliated information," Papers 97-13, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    15. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2009. "Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 95-121, September.
    16. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
    17. Cary A. Deck & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Fixed Revenue Auctions: Theory And Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 342-354, July.
    18. Michael Klein, 1998. "Rebidding for Concessions," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11524, The World Bank.
    19. Levy, Haim & Lazarovich-Porat, Esther, 1995. "Signaling theory and risk perception: An experimental study," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, pages 39-56.
    20. David S. Salkever & Richard G. Frank, 1995. "Economic Issues in Vaccine Purchase Arrangements," NBER Working Papers 5248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2010. "Auctions and corruption: An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1872-1892, October.
    22. Kristóf Madarász, 2015. "Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/566, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    23. Erwin Amann & Heng Qiao, 2008. "Three Sequential Cases: from Symmetry to Asymmetry," TWI Research Paper Series 37, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universit�t Konstanz.
    24. repec:cep:stitep:566 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.

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