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Shadow pricing diversity in U. S. national forests

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  • Boltz, Frederick
  • Douglas, R. Carter
  • Michael, G. Jacobson

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  • Boltz, Frederick & Douglas, R. Carter & Michael, G. Jacobson, 2002. "Shadow pricing diversity in U. S. national forests," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 185-197.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:foreco:v:8:y:2002:i:3:p:185-197
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    4. Hayri Önal, 1997. "Trade-off between Structural Diversity and Economic Objectives in Forest Management," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(3), pages 1001-1012.
    5. repec:aen:journl:1998v19-04-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1984. "Tobit models: A survey," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 3-61.
    7. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    8. Roan, Philip F. & Martin, Wade E., 1996. "Optimal Production and Reclamation at a Mine Site with an Ecosystem Constraint," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 186-198, March.
    9. Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 125-142, January.
    10. Montgomery Claire A. & Brown Jr. , Gardner M. & Adams Darius M., 1994. "The Marginal Cost of Species Preservation: The Northern Spotted Owl," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 111-128, March.
    11. Leffler, Keith B & Rucker, Randal R & Munn, Ian A, 2000. "Transaction Costs and the Collection of Information: Presale Measurement on Private Timber Sales," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 166-188, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphaële Préget, 2011. "What is the cost of low participation in French Timber auctions?," Post-Print hal-00670762, HAL.
    2. Yamamoto, Yuki & Takeuchi, Kenji & Shinkuma, Takayoshi, 2014. "Is there a price premium for certified wood? Empirical evidence from log auction data in Japan," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 168-172.
    3. Yuki Yamamoto & Kenji Takeuchi & Takayoshi Shinkuma, 2012. "Are There Price Premiums for Certified Wood? Empirical Evidence from Log Auction Data in Japan," Discussion Papers 1209, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    4. Kurt Niquidet & G. Cornelis van Kooten, 2004. "Are Log Markets Competitive? Empirical Evidence and Implications for Canada-U.S. Trade in Softwood Lumber," Working Papers 2004-04, University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group.

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