IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions

Listed author(s):
  • Laurent Lamy


Registered author(s):

    We analyse a unique data set on multi-unit ascending auctions,which contains the whole dynamic of bidders' behavior in the IFAauctionsselling the right to use the electric transmission capacity betweenFrance and England. First, we document that daily auctions suffer from a great extent of underpricing and that the winning priceand the award concentration are varying a lot across time periods.Second, we fail to explain this evidence by winner's curse-driven arguments.The time periods, which are proxying for small changes inthe bidding rules, seem to play a significant role in the extent of underpricing.Our empirical findings are consistent with the view thatdaily multi-unit ascending auctions among a small number of potentialbidders allow a large panel of outcomes, in particular very collusiveones.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    File Function: Crest working paper version
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Statistics in its series Working Papers with number 2007-27.

    in new window

    Length: 50
    Date of creation: 2007
    Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-27
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    B√Ętiment ENSAE, 5 rue Henry LE Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau

    Phone: 01 41 17 60 81
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sri Srikandan)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.