Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's cursedriven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner's curse and the champion's plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.
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- Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February.
- Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
- Scott, James H & Wolf, Charles R, 1979. "The Efficient Diversification of Bids in Treasury Bill Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 61(2), pages 280-287, May.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1991. "Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 370-375, March.
- Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-764.
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