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Winner's Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from the Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions

Author

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  • Hoidal Bjonnes, Geir

    (Swedish Institute for Financial Research)

Abstract

This paper studies bidder behavior using a detailed data set consisting of actual bid distributions in Norwegian Treasury bill auctions held during 1993-1998. The empirical results presented suggest that observed bidder behavior is consistent with an adjustment for the winner’s curse. Bidders shade and disperse their bids more, and reduce quantity demanded, when the number of competing bidders increases. Tests suggest that there are some differences between the individual bidders. For instance, the most frequent bidders tend to disperse their bids more than other bidders, on average. Differences in bid shading and bidder profits can not be explained by bidder frequency or bidder size.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoidal Bjonnes, Geir, 2001. "Winner's Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from the Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions," SIFR Research Report Series 3, Institute for Financial Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0003
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    File URL: http://www.sifr.org/PDFs/curseJF6.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    2. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    4. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
    5. Yasushi Hamao & Narasimhan Jegadeesh, 1998. "An Analysis of Bidding in the Japanese Government Bond Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 755-772, April.
    6. Scott, James H & Wolf, Charles R, 1979. "The Efficient Diversification of Bids in Treasury Bill Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 61(2), pages 280-287, May.
    7. Michael B. Gordy, "undated". "Multiple Bids in a Multiple-Unit Common Value Auction," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _021, Society for Computational Economics.
    8. Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist & Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2002. "Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 394-424, April.
    9. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2003. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions," Working Papers 2003.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2007. "Bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank: Evidence from a panel sample selection model," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1521-1543, May.
    3. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2002. "Bidding and performance in repo auctions: evidence from ECB open market operations," Working Paper Series 0157, European Central Bank.
    4. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1865-1902, August.
    5. Nautz, Dieter & Linzert, Tobias & Breitung, Jörg, 2003. "Bidder Behavior in Repo Auctions without Minimum Bid Rate: Evidence from the Bundesbank," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2003,13, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2004. "The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB," Working Paper Series 359, European Central Bank.
    7. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
    8. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2016. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 11731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Rocholl, Jörg, 2005. "Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2005,15, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    10. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Breitung, Jorg, 2006. "Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 215-230, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Treasury Securities; Winner's Curse;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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