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The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB

Author

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  • Linzert, Tobias
  • Nautz, Dieter
  • Bindseil, Ulrich

Abstract

This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical performance of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks' bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank's bidding depends on bank characteristics. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB's main refinancing operations, we find evidence for the winner's curse effect in LTROs. Our results indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes. JEL Classification: E52, D44

Suggested Citation

  • Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2004. "The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB," Working Paper Series 359, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2004359
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp359.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters,in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 475-492 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ayuso, Juan & Repullo, Rafael, 2001. "Why did the banks overbid? An empirical model of the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 857-870, November.
    3. Breitung, Jorg & Nautz, Dieter, 2001. "The empirical performance of the ECB's repo auctions: evidence from aggregated and individual bidding data," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 839-856, November.
    4. Hoidal Bjonnes, Geir, 2001. "Winner's Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from the Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions," SIFR Research Report Series 3, Institute for Financial Research.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vogel, Edgar, 2014. "MRO bidding in the presence of LTROs: an empirical analysis of the pre-crisis period," Working Paper Series 1753, European Central Bank.
    2. Ullrich, Katrin, 2006. "Market discipline and the use of government bonds as collateral in the EMU," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-046, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
    4. Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault, 2018. "Les interventions de crise de la FED et de la BCE diffèrent-elles ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2018-31, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Eisenschmidt, Jens & Hirsch, Astrid & Linzert, Tobias, 2009. "Bidding behaviour in the ECB's main refinancing operations during the financial crisis," Working Paper Series 1052, European Central Bank.
    6. Bindseil, Ulrich & Nyborg, Kjell G., 2007. "Monetary policy implementation: A European Perspective," Discussion Papers 2007/10, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    7. Välimäki, Tuomas, 2006. "Why the marginal MRO rate exceeds the ECB policy rate?," Research Discussion Papers 20/2006, Bank of Finland.
    8. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Breitung, Jorg, 2006. "Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 215-230, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Monetary Policy Instruments ECB; Winner's Curse;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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