IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Market discipline and the use of government bonds as collateral in the EMU


  • Ullrich, Katrin


The confidence that financial markets are able to discipline the debt behaviour of governments is not very high. Therefore, the Stability and Growth Pact has been implemented as an institutional constraint to substitute for the market mechanism. With the weakening of the Pact, market discipline could gain importance again. To strengthen market discipline, reasons for its failure in the euro area have to be analysed. One possible reason could be that the European Central Bank accepts all European government bonds without distinction in its monetary policy auctions as collateral. This could provide the financial market with a signal that these government securities are equally (non-)risky and that a differentiation with respect to risk premia is not needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ullrich, Katrin, 2006. "Market discipline and the use of government bonds as collateral in the EMU," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-046, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5436

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Giampaolo Gabbi & Andrea Sironi, 2005. "Which factors affect corporate bonds pricing? Empirical evidence from eurobonds primary market spreads," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 59-74.
    2. Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
    3. von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    4. Sylvester Eijffinger, 2003. "How can the Stability and Growth Pact be improved to achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(1), pages 10-15, January.
    5. Ardagna Silvia & Caselli Francesco & Lane Timothy, 2007. "Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-35, August.
    6. Arnold, Ivo & Lemmen, Jan, 2001. "The Vulnerability of Banks to Government Default Risk in the EMU," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 101-125, Spring.
    7. Alessandra Casella, 1999. "Tradable deficit permits:efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(29), pages 321-362, October.
    8. Philippe Cuneo & Jacques Mairesse, 1984. "Productivity and R&D at the Firm Level in French Manufacturing," NBER Chapters,in: R&D, Patents, and Productivity, pages 375-392 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Michael Artis & Bernhard Winkler, 1998. "The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 163(1), pages 87-98, January.
    10. Jan J.G. Lemmen & Charles A.E. Goodhart, 1999. "Credit Risks and European Government Bond Markets: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 77-107, Winter.
    11. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-571, October.
    12. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, April.
    13. Gande, Amar & Parsley, David C., 2005. "News spillovers in the sovereign debt market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 691-734, March.
    14. Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1991. "Monetary Policy in an Emerging European Economic and Monetary Union: Key Issues," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(2), pages 356-373, June.
    15. Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Credible at last? Reforming the Stability Pact," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(1), pages 15-18, January.
    16. Bernoth, Kerstin & Schuknecht, Ludger & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Lorenzo Codogno & Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2003. "Yield spreads on EMU government bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 503-532, October.
    18. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2004. "The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB," Working Paper Series 359, European Central Bank.
    19. Elton, Edwin J. & Gruber, Martin J. & Agrawal, Deepak & Mann, Christopher, 2004. "Factors affecting the valuation of corporate bonds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2747-2767, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Honkapohja, Seppo, 2014. "The Euro Area Crisis: A View from the North," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 260-271.

    More about this item


    Stability and Growth Pact; Market Discipline; Collateral; Repo;

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.