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Rules and risk in the euro area

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  • Anna Iara
  • Guntram B. Wolff

Abstract

Anna Iara and Guntram Wolff develop a model of sovereign spreads that are determined by the probability of default in interaction with the level of risk aversion. Estimation of the model confirms the central predictions. The legal basis for the rules, and mechanisms for enforcing them, are the most important dimensions of rulesbased fiscal governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Iara & Guntram B. Wolff, 2011. "Rules and risk in the euro area," Working Papers 615, Bruegel.
  • Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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