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Fiscal Discipline and the Question of Convergence of National Interest Rates in the European Union

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  • Volbert Alexander
  • Peter Anker

Abstract

In this paper, interest-rate convergence in Europe is related to the behavior of integrated federal political systems. Our main results are: Before the final fixing of exchange rates, national interest rates will converge toward the German bond yield in countries eligible to become EMU members in part because no-bailout clauses are not credible in the starting period of EMU. Should such clauses become more credible after 2002 because the EU government and its redistributive mechanisms remain weak, the “market-discipline hypothesis” has a greater chance to apply. But it may still prove unequal to the task of discouraging excessive fiscal deficits on its own. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Suggested Citation

  • Volbert Alexander & Peter Anker, 1997. "Fiscal Discipline and the Question of Convergence of National Interest Rates in the European Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 335-352, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:8:y:1997:i:4:p:335-352
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008234929142
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    Cited by:

    1. Iara, Anna & Wolff, Guntram B., 2014. "Rules and risk in the Euro area," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 222-236.
    2. Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2004. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," ZEI Working Papers B 26-2003, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    3. Ondřej Schneider & Petr Hedbávný & Jan Zápal, 2007. "A Fiscal Rule that Has Teeth: A Suggestion for a “Fiscal Sustainability Council” Underpinned by the Financial Markets," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 32-53, March.
    4. Richard Hule & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 25-38, March.
    5. Mr. Ermal Hitaj & Yasin Kursat Onder, 2013. "Fiscal Discipline in WAEMU: Rules, Institutions, and Markets," IMF Working Papers 2013/216, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Alexander, Volbert & von Furstenberg, George M., 2000. "Monetary unions--a superior alternative to full dollarization in the long run," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 205-225, December.
    7. Clara Galliani & Stefano Zedda, 2015. "Will the Bail-in Break the Vicious Circle Between Banks and their Sovereign?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 597-614, April.

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