IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/epruwp/97-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency:

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth M. Kletzer

Abstract

The implications of monetary unification for fiscal policies are discussed. The roles of nominal exchange rate flexibility in the presence of asymmetric national shocks and nominal price rigidities as an automatic stabilizer and source of disturbances to real economic performance are reviewed. Two main themes are considered. The first is whether a system of fiscal insurance across member states qualitatively replicates the effects of autonomous monetary policy instruments when exchange rates are permanently fixed. It is argued that while fiscal insurance schemes increase the instruments available to fiscal authorities to influence resource allocation, they do not augment existing fiscal instruments in a manner that replicates monetary policy under long run monetary neutrality in an overlapping generations economy. Restrictions imposed on national fiscal instruments as a condition of monetary unification may give rise to a need for fiscal insurance to replace their role as stabilizers. The second theme adresses whether political unification is a necessary logical conclusion of the usefulness of fiscal insurance scheme. The argument that sustainable insurance arrangements can be devised without foregoing national sovereignty over fiscal policymaking is discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth M. Kletzer, "undated". "Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency:," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-22, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:97-22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp9722.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Quah, Danny, 1989. "The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply Disturbances," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 655-673, September.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1998. "Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 989-1008, July.
    4. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "European Monetary Unification," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1321-1357, September.
    5. Tamim Bayoumi & Alun Thomas, 1995. "Relative Prices and Economic Adjustment in the United States and the European Union: A Real Story about EMU," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 108-133, March.
    6. von Hagen, Jurgen & Hammond, George W, 1998. "Regional Insurance against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 66(3), pages 331-353, June.
    7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. Kletzer, Kenneth & Wright, Brian D., 1995. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," CUDARE Working Papers 198642, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    9. Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Silvio Borner & Herbert Grubel (ed.), The European Community after 1992, chapter 8, pages 138-161, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Paul De Grauwe & Wim Vanhaverbeke, 2014. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area? Evidence from Regional Data," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 8, pages 231-252, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Torres,Francisco & Giavazzi,Francesco (ed.), 1993. "Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521440196, October.
    14. Jacques Mélitz, 1995. "A suggested reformulation of the theory of optimal currency areas," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 281-298, July.
    15. Buiter, Willem H., 1995. "Macroeconomic Policy During a Transition to Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    17. Kenneth A. Froot & Kenneth Rogoff, 1991. "The EMS, the EMU, and the Transition to a Common Currency," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 269-328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. James C. Ingram, 1959. "State and Regional Payments Mechanisms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 619-632.
    19. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Diba, Behzad T., 1991. "Fiscal deficits, financial integration, and a central bank for Europe," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 381-403, December.
    20. Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February.
    22. Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, 1992. "Wage and Employment Adjustment in Local Labor Markets," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number wea, November.
    23. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1993. "The Unstable EMS," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1), pages 51-144.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kenen, Peter B., 2000. "Currency areas, policy domains, and the institutionalization of fixed exchange rates," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20170, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:5:y:2006:i:9:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2001. "The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 179-204, May.
    4. Pascale Duran-Vigneron, 2006. "Interactions des politiques monétaire et budgétaires: évaluation dans un cadre nouveau keynésien," Working Papers hal-03551474, HAL.
    5. Edward M. Gramlich & Paul R. Wood, "undated". "Fiscal Federalism and European Integration: Implications for Fiscal and Monetary Policies," International Finance Discussion Papers 0694, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 10 Dec 2019.
    6. Christophe Schalck, 2006. "The stability Pact and the coordination of fiscal policies in the EMU," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(9), pages 1-11.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1997. "Macroeconomic stabilization with a common currency: Does European Monetary Unification create a need for fiscal insurance of federalism?," ZEI Working Papers B 04-1997, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    2. Buiter, Willem H., 1995. "Macroeconomic Policy During a Transition to Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Ricci, Luca Antonio, 2008. "A Model of an Optimum Currency Area," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-31.
    4. Schor, Armand-Denis, 2000. "La théorie des zones monétaires optimales : l’optimum, le praticable, le crédible et le réel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(4), pages 545-576, décembre.
    5. Hélène Erkel-Rousse, 1997. "Degré de flexibilité des marchés du travail, ajustement à des chocs asymétriques et union monétaire européenne," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 128(2), pages 79-100.
    6. Lars Jonung & Eoin Drea, 2010. "It Can't Happen, It's a Bad Idea, It Won't Last: U.S. Economists on the EMU and the Euro, 1989–2002," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 7(1), pages 1-4–52, January.
    7. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
    8. Alban Mathieu, 2021. "Frankel and Rose’s Introduction to the Endogeneity of Optimality: A Model Limited to the European Monetary Experience," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 2, pages 299-314, July.
    9. Eleni Roussou & Norman Cameron, 2005. "The Impact of the European Economic & Monetary Union on the Stability of the Greek Economy," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 85-98.
    10. Charles Wyplosz, 1997. "EMU: Why and How It Might Happen," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 3-21, Fall.
    11. Dominick Salvatore, 1998. "International Monetary and Financial Arrangements: Present and Future," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 375-416, January.
    12. Juan Luís Ollero & Raul Ramos & Jordi Suriñach-Caralt, 2001. "Macroeconomic implications of EMU at the regional level," ERSA conference papers ersa01p146, European Regional Science Association.
    13. Weimann, Marco, 2002. "OCA theory and EMU eastern enlargement: An empirical application," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 07/02, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    14. repec:zbw:bofrdp:1997_008 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Davide Furceri, 2002. "Risk-sharing e architettura istituzionale delle politiche di stabilizzazione nell'UME: aspetti metodologici e verifica empirica," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 92(6), pages 175-210, November-.
    16. Joao L. M. Amador, 2000. "Fiscal federalism in continuous time stochastic economies," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp383, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    17. Jääskelä, Jarkko, 1997. "Incomplete insurance market and its policy implication within European Monetary Union," Research Discussion Papers 8/1997, Bank of Finland.
    18. M. Mar㈠& M. Sarcinelli, 1994. "The European Union: how to assign the functions of government," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(191), pages 341-377.
    19. Paolo Pasimeni, 2014. "An Optimum Currency Crisis," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 11(2), pages 173-204, December.
    20. J.M.C. Santos Silva & Silvana Tenreyro, 2010. "Currency Unions in Prospect and Retrospect," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 51-74, September.
    21. Sorensen, Bent E. & Yosha, Oved, 1998. "International risk sharing and European monetary unification," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 211-238, August.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:97-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epcbsdk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.