Federal fiscal constitutions part 1: risk sharing and moral hazard
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- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Papers 519, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1993. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 222.93, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 728, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lori L. Leachman & Guillermo Rosas & Peter Lange & Alan Bester, 2007. "The Political Economy Of Budget Deficits," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 369-420, November.
- Luca Agnello & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2009. "The Determinants of Public Deficit Volatility," NIPE Working Papers 11/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Jääskelä, Jarkko, 1997. "Incomplete insurance market and its policy implication within European Monetary Union," Research Discussion Papers 8/1997, Bank of Finland.
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- Caillaud, B. & Jullien, B. & Picard, P., 1996. "National vs European incentive policies: Bargaining, information and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 91-111, January.
- Fausto Hernández Trillo & Alberto Díaz Cayeros & Rafael Gamboa González, 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization in Mexico: The Bailout Problem," Research Department Publications 3143, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Tesar, Linda L., 1995. "Evaluating the gains from international risksharing," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 95-143, June.
- Olga Lucía Acosta N. & Israel Fainboim & Catalina Gutiérrez S. & Blanca Cecilia Zuluaga D., 1999. "Relaciones fiscales entre el Distrito Especial de Bogotá y la Nación," COYUNTURA SOCIAL 013094, FEDESARROLLO.
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More about this item
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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